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**Perceptions of power. The case of the NGO Esperanza Bolivia and its influence in the  
production and commercialization of quinoa in Yunchará**

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## **Abstract**

Since 2010, Bolivian NGO Esperanza Bolivia (EB) leads the production and commercialisation of quinoa in Yunchará. Even though they are transferring the ownership of the project to the local partner and beneficiaries; they still play the main role in all the phases of the value chain. EB has also encouraged the creation of a local quinoa association (APROQUY) and continuously raises awareness and executes knowledge transfer about the production and consumption of the quinoa among different stakeholders (e.g. government, farmers, school staff, students, donors, inhabitants of Yunchará).

The aim of this thesis is to identify the other main stakeholders involved in the production and value chain and their relation with EB; demonstrate how NGO's multiple stakeholders relations and partnerships inevitably influence the local quinoa's value chain as well as the local quinoa association; and explain, how such relations can become complex and lead to contradictive or (un)conscious actions. In addition, it was identified that geographical, social, cultural and historical features (such as the culture of paternalism, recent given "power" to the peasant, individualism or economic migration) should be considered as influences to the quinoa production and commercialisation.

The introduction discusses the rising production and commercialisation under the umbrella of a desired food security in a critical manner; how quinoa's farmers have learnt to maximise their commercial activities by forming association; and the support given to the associations by the NGOs and international development cooperation agencies supported their development.

The theoretical framework overview of the NGOs' most common dilemmas (i.e. being donor economic dependant or work in a "project-delivery services" frame); the different characteristics to achieve balanced relations and partnerships (i.e. mutual trust, complementary, common goals, or equitable distribution of costs and benefits), and the types of power that can be used to produce a change in a person or community (i.e. reward, coercion, legitimacy, expertise, reference and informational or persuasion).

Participant-observation with the EB's team, semi-structured and unstructured interviews with several stakeholders and literature review allowed me to conclude that Esperanza Bolivia's relationships with the partners are based on long-term trust and legitimacy. These institutions have a common belief (reference base of power) and they complement each other with their different strengths (i.e. expertise, legitimacy or informational base of power). I conclude that the constant need and effort to be legitimate strongly influence EB actions and reactions. EB also faces different dilemmas: economic dependency on donors or working in a top-down design within a project delivery base. It is also mentioned the commonalities and potential risks for the Yunchará's farmers that appear from the comparison of the realities of quinoa farmers with the realities of the associations that supply the international market (i.e. quinoa remains positioned as a commodity and niche food, due to its high selling price and limited local availability).

## **Abbreviations**

NGO EB or EB: NGO Esperanza Bolivia

NGO LC or LC: NGO Louvain Coopération

APROQUY: Asociación de Productores de Quinoa de Yunchará/ Yunachará' Quinoa Producers Association

PROMETA: Organización sin fines de lucro para la Protección del Medio Ambiente de Tarija/ NPO Tarija's environment protection

GMY/MY: Gobierno Autónomo Municipal de Yunchará/ Autonomous Municipal Government of Yunchará

Project SAES: Esperanza Bolivia project for "Food Security and Sustainable Economic Security in the Highlands and Central Valley in Tarija".

## **Translations & definitions**

*Quinueros*: quinoa producers

*Beneficiado*: cleaning process that cleans the grain and remove the saponin

*Quinoa Real*: Variety of quinoa, usually exported

*Saponin*: complex mixture of glycosides and it is generally considered to be part of the plant's defence system against pathogens and herbivores (Bazile, Bertero, & Nieto, 2014, p. 267). This eye-invisible layer of the grain gives a soapy-bitter flavour if it is not removed before cooking. Saponins can be removed mechanically or manually. In Yunchará, the removal is done manually grilling and/or washing the quinoa until there is no foam.

*Quintal*: 46kg

*Arroba*: 11.5kg

*Panoja*: part of the quinoa plant where all the grains are located

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## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Quinoa, its nutritional highlights and its relation to the Bolivian diet

Quinoa (*Chenopodium Quinoa Willd*) is not only valued for its nutritional qualities, but also for its high adaptability to climatic conditions. This “super food” is a grain providing high quality protein content and most of the essential amino acids. Further, it is gluten-free, rich in minerals, vitamins, fatty acids and other nutrients. Certain quinoa varieties can grow under difficult climate conditions (e.g. resistant to salinity or to very variable temperature<sup>1</sup>). Quinoa can grow in highlands and in lowlands, and produced under low production costs (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, 2013).

Quinoa has been part of the Bolivian diet for more than 7 000 years together with other locally produced vegetables such as potato, *chuño*<sup>2</sup>, corn, fava beans or *ch'arki*<sup>3</sup>. Today, quinoa is consumed in different food preparations where the grain (or the plant) is the main or secondary ingredient in starters, main dish, snack or dessert. Nowadays it is possible to find also quinoa's sub products (e.g. quinoa flour, air-popped quinoa or quinoa flakes) or products based with quinoa (e.g. breakfast cereals, granola bars or cookies) in the Bolivian supermarkets or small food shops.

The versatile quinoa plant is not only used for food consumption. For example, the stem (high in cellulose) is used as burning wood or for paper fabrication. Together with the leaves, it is employed for animal forage. The ashes of burnt quinoa's stem and main roots are used to prepare *llipt'a*<sup>4</sup>, that it is used for coca leaves chewing. When mixed with lime, quinoa is used to treat skin diseases or it is part of fabric plasters to treat broken bones. As saponin<sup>5</sup>, quinoa can be used in soap production, detergent preparations and in some cases as pest control (Bhargava, Shukla, & Ohri, 2006; Browman, 2004; Fundación PROINPA, 2004; Guerrero, 2014b; Mario Tapia, s. d.; Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras & Consejo Nacional de Comercializadores y Productores de Quinoa, 2009).

### 1.2 From proposed worldwide food security solution to a real cash crop, how is this affecting the local farmers?

In 2013, the Food and Agriculture Organization recognised quinoa as a super food and **[potential worldwide solution for food security]**. In parallel, the United Nations General Assembly declared in 2013 the "International Year of the Quinoa", in recognition of ancestral practices of the Andean people, who have managed to preserve quinoa in its natural state as food for present and future generations through ancestral practices of living in harmony with nature (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, 2013).

The FAO's Food Security Programme (2008) defines four dimensions of food security: physical availability of food, economic and physical access to food, [optimal] food utilization and stability of these three points. Positioning quinoa as a worldwide panacea for food security may be in contradiction to the fact that it has been exported as a niche product to the North countries for only at least the past 14 years (Reyes, 2013) and that the increasing international demand is affecting its local consumption in Bolivia, one of the main producers. Another contradiction is that it seems impossible to continue preserving quinoa's natural state and the ancestral practices while producing enough quantity for satisfying worldwide food security demands.

Quinoa's worldwide production has increased dramatically over the past ten years, passing from 20 000 tonnes to 80 000 tonnes in 2011 (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, 2013; Friedman-Rudovsky, 2012). At the

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<sup>1</sup> From minus 4 to 35C°

<sup>2</sup> Dehydrated potato. Traditional way to store and conserve potatoes for long time periods.

<sup>3</sup> Sun dried meat, could be sheep or llama.

<sup>4</sup> *Llipt'a*: mixed ashes with water or milk until it develops a paste consistency. People create small round flat pieces and dry them under the sun. The ashes are alkaline and ease the extraction of cocaine during the chewing, as a consequence coca leaves are more stimulant.

<sup>5</sup> Eye-invisible layer of the grain that gives a soapy-bitter flavour if it is not removed before cooking. In Yunchará there are removed manually grilling and/or washing the quinoa until there is no foam.

same time, export prices have doubled (Reyes, 2013). Even if Bolivia and Peru remain the main original quinoa exporters<sup>6</sup>, other countries started to produce and export quinoa (e.g. Ecuador, United States, or France) and continue to increase their market-share. For example in 2012, 17 % of the exports came from US and Europe. Bolivian loss in the quinoa's market share is not the result of a low productivity, but of an increased production volume from all producers and new countries accessing the market.

Even if Bolivia has reduced its market share, during the past five years, quinoa exports have grown from 15.5 tonnes to 29.7 tonnes, and doubled in terms of monetary value per tonne<sup>7</sup> (« Bolivia: exportaciones de quinua », 2013; Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, 2015). The country exports the grain to 25 countries; USA is the most important trade partner (59%), followed by France (7%), Germany (7%), Netherlands (6%) and Canada (6%) (Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, 2014). In fact, in monetary terms, quinoa is the second exportable non-traditional staple<sup>8</sup>; but in volume is the fifth on the list (Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, 2015). These numbers demonstrate, that Quinoa has become an exportable cash crop, especially for the Oruro region, in the southern highlands, where 87% of the exported quinoa was produced (Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, 2014).

Based on several academic reviews and press articles (Ballvé, 2007; Carimentrand & Ballet, 2010; Costas, 2012, 2012; Del Castillo, 2008; Friedman-Rudovsky, 2012; Garcia Cardenas & Cusicanqui, 2012; Institución Financiera de Desarrollo, 2001; Jimenez, 2012; Kim, 2013; Los Tiempos, 2013; Muriel & Evia, 2011; Ofstehage, 2012; Quisbert and Valleur 2009 cited in Ofstehage, 2012; Romero & Shahriari, 2011; SIVEX cited in Jimenez, 2012; UNESCO, 2012), it can be deduced that in Bolivia, the urge to increase quinoa's production volume and benefit of the "quinoa fever" has influenced the farmers on all levels: professionally, socially and in their relation with the nature. First, farmers have learnt to establish and consolidate relations with the government and third party institutions (e.g., researchers, associations, international institutions). Second, (mainly) through associations, farmers are learning to participate in (inter)national business life. Third, farmers are adopting (or not) new production methods and in some cases are changing their relation with the nature. Last but not least, farmers themselves experience changes in lifestyle habits and new comfort standards. In general, the identified positive aftereffects can be summed up as the following: a) improved living standards. Due to a rise in quinoa sales, there is an increase of the family income that allows the purchase of food, household items, clothes or school material, the ability to afford elementary school and university education or even an improvement of family housing; b) gained better access of farmers to low rate loans and technology that help to increase the production (usually subsidised by the government); c) the rise of the economic value of the grain leads to a return to the region of community members that migrated for economic reasons to urban areas. The negative impacts observed are: a) land tenure disputes between different communities and regions; b) soil degradation due to the adoption of unnecessary technologies and methods that are harming the environment and a loss of agriculture traditions<sup>9</sup>; c) few varieties dominating the export<sup>10</sup> leads to monocropping and loss of varieties of the quinoa; d) domestic price augmentation encourages the consumption of cheaper and less nutritive food such as rice and dried wheat pasta. Malnutrition in children has increased in quinoa-growing areas; e) increasing power of private business in the export value chain and farmers production under contracting bases.

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<sup>6</sup> In 2008, both countries shared 92% of quinoa's exportation (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2013). For consecutive years, Bolivia has been the main producer, however, in 2014 Peru was the main exporter with 40 000 tons of quinoa (Carpenter, 2015).

<sup>7</sup> There is a difference between the export price and Bolivian domestic price. The Bolivian export price in 2014 was of 6 703 USD per tonne (Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, 2015); while the producer price in the internal market of Challapata (one of the main markets) plunged from 1 500 – 1 600 Bolivianos (217-231 Euros) to 900 Bolivianos (130 USD) the *quintal* (« Reportan drástica caída en el precio de la quinua », 2014). Converting the price per tonne, the domestic price paid to the producers in 2014 varied from 5 021 USD to 2 826 USD per tonne. The internal market is not only influenced by the international demand and the new producer's countries, but for the quinoa illegally imported from Peru that alter the internal offer. Export price has slightly reduced during 2014 but for the domestic producer price.

<sup>8</sup> The first one is soy and its sub-products.

<sup>9</sup> Originally, quinoa was cultivated in rotation with potato and fava bean. Farmers also raised sheep and llamas and its manure was used as fertiliser. A land fallow is advised.

<sup>10</sup> Just three varieties cover more than 75% of the entire Bolivian quinoa production (FAO, 2013). The Bolivian government has classified over 1 300 varieties of quinoa. However some interviewed people mentioned that there should be around 3 000 varieties, but many of them are not categorized (« Interview with Josué », 2014).

During the last years, the increasing selling price<sup>11</sup> has diminished the national consumption and Bolivians look for cheaper options such as rice or wheat products (dried pasta). In some cases, a kilogram of quinoa is sold three a four times the price for the same weight. On the one hand, the rise of production for exportation is supported by government but on the other hand, the same government; is installing policies and campaigns aiming at increasing the quinoa local consumption, especially of vulnerable targets such as pregnant and nursing women, elderly people or toddlers. The growth of the national consumption is a direct consequence of the National Quinoa Policy launched in 2009. Víctor Hugo Vásquez, vice minister of Rural Development and Lands, states that from 2009 to 2012 the national consumption tripled from 4 000 tonnes to 12 000 tonnes and that the per capita consumption increased from 0.35 kilograms to 1.1 kilograms. However, quinoa is yet far from being part of the average diet. In 2012, the National Institute of the Agriculture and Forestry Innovation (INIAF) identified the most consumed products that are also part of the national food security and sovereignty. Among them: potato, wheat and its sub-products<sup>12</sup>, sugar, rice, chicken, vegetable (soy) oil, onions and tomatoes. As a reference, 92 kg/per capita of potatoes are consumed in a year, while rice is 36 kg/per capita and onion is 9 kg/per capita (Periódico Digital PIEB, 2012).

### 1.3 NGO's/NPO's as catalyst and brokers in the Bolivian quinoa (export) value chain

In the case of the commercialisation, NGOs and NPOs have accompanied the farmers, their associations and cooperatives throughout their conception phase, supported and endorsed the first commercial exchanges or guided them to fulfil import requirements. Also, they are in some cases, NGOs had been associated partners or intermediaries. As a result, the scope of influence of non-governmental and non-profit organisations in the value chain is large: institutional endorsement, funding intermediaries, technology transfer, certification, quality control or the commercialisation.

Based on studies of Carimentrand and Ballet (2010), Jimenez (2012), Laguna (2006), from the 70's to the end of the 80's, it was the beginning of the quinoa's fair trade movement (led primarily by non-profit organizations) and the creation of the two main farmer's organizations: the National Quinoa Producers Association (ANAPQUI) and the *Central de Cooperativas Agropecuarias Operación Tierra* (CECAOT). NGOs supported and encouraged the creation of the first's quinoa associations. During the 90's, there was an increase of demand for organic quinoa. In parallel, the Bolivian Organic Certification Agency, BOLICERT, was found by the Association of Organic Producers of Bolivia (AOPEB) with the advice and support of the German Development Service (DED) and the trade organisation *Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Partnerschaft mit der Dritten Welt*<sup>13</sup> (GEPA). It should be mentioned that the condition for commercial trade between ANAPQUI and German importers was the guarantee of an organic certification.

However, in some cases it can be presumed that NGOs or cooperation agencies may have double agendas or an interest in gaining advantages from the quinoa boom. For example, NGOs have also been partnered with commercial partners. In the 90's, the Bolivian family company, CAM, associated with EURONAT (a private organic cereal retailer), *Moulin des Moines* (producer for EURONAT) and the NGO *Punto de Apoyo* (that supports humanitarian projects in Bolivia). The NGO *Punto de Apoyo* took advantage of their status and commercialised the variety of the *quinoa real* plant in the French supermarkets *Super U* from 1990. In addition, the NGO benefited from a sales commission from EURONAT. This partenariat ended in 1992 due to lack of payments to quinoa farmers and frauds from CAM. Afterwards, EURONAT and *Punto de Apoyo* had a new commercial agreement with ANAPQUI, who were unique producers association that was certified. The agreement was not renewed due to supply struggles in terms of volume and quality. Laguna (2006) states that EURONAT and *Punto de Apoyo* continued their agreement and it was sold among Northern food distribution chains (via Carrefour). Part of the agreement included a donation of 0.10 Euros to *Punto de Apoyo* for each sold box of 500 grs of quinoa (Laguna, 2006). Another example is the support of USAID to Bolivian farmers. As mentioned before, 59% of the quinoa is exported to USA. The North American country is interested in keeping up a steady supply of organic quinoa, therefore will grant technical support to Bolivian farmers.

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<sup>11</sup> Influenced by the rising international demand of North countries and decreasing domestic offer (only 24% of the production is for the national market) (Quispe, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Curiously, Bolivia has a deficit of wheat production of almost 40% (Periódico Digital PIEB, 2012).

<sup>13</sup> Lit. English: Society for the Promotion of partnership with the Third World.

USAID's website published: "Did you know that much of the quinoa you enjoy is grown by farmers in Bolivia? USAID is helping Bolivian quinoa farmers gain access to improved equipment that can increase their capacity six fold, while reducing the energy consumption associated with growing it. The new equipment allows the farmers to fulfil more quinoa orders from the U.S. (USAID, 2001)".

The farmers' associations have benefited from the relation and support of the NGOs and NPOs for the production and distribution of the grain. Dependency can take form in material and non-material forms. Material could be considered money, machinery, transport. Non-material are the institutional support, consulting, knowledge and time. Some authors as Carimertrand & Ballet (2009; 2010) and Lagunas (2011; 2006) mention that farmers association needed to build trust and legitimacy with different stakeholders first. Farmer's association linking with NGOs and NPOs became trusty and legitimate when supplying the demanded volume in the specific quality and duly certificated. Those requests from Northern countries (i.e. buyers, consumers) fuelled this development. Agreements stopped when an association could not fulfil orders anymore.

In the introduction it was mentioned that for Bolivian culture, quinoa is not only a high nutritional grain but also part of traditional staples. This means that the usage of quinoa goes beyond food consumption. Additionally, it was underlined that as a consequence of the promoted qualities of the quinoa as a "super food" and its success as a niche product, the economic value of the "golden grain" has doubled in the past years and that the worldwide production continues to increase. The appealing export market has attracted new stakeholders. First, the quinoa associations and cooperatives; afterwards, the national private sector and lately the international investors. In case of the quinoa associations and cooperatives, they have been endorsed and guided by the non-governmental organisations and Development Cooperation Agencies. NGOs have been present at different stages, like the creation of the association or a certification agency or in the process of production improvement or as mediators in the commercial agreements. For a long time, farmers' associations and cooperatives have learnt to cooperate and work with NGOs. Over time, the associations and cooperatives have built trust and legitimacy, not only to be able to benefit from grants, funds, development and technical assistance, but also to access and adapt their products to the international market.

Are NGOs friends or foes? On the one hand, thanks to their privileged position and legitimacy, NGOs could guide and endorse the quinoa associations to access the international market or receive funding for local projects. On the other hand, it can be assumed that in specific cases, NGO's actions intend to take advantage of the quinoa's high economic value and ensure the permanent supply of quinoa to the North countries. Another reason is that NGOs simply benefited from the international interest in the grain to obtain funding and develop projects in Bolivia in the name of economic development or food security. The importance in this discussion is to underline the unquestionable and influent position that a non-governmental organisation has on a quinoa's production expansion and association's development.

It is in the nature of the NGO's to be in relation with a large diversity of stakeholders (e.g. government, producers, researchers, project funders, intermediaries, press, consumers...). Mitlin *et al.* (2007, p. 1702) argue that a NGOs can only be understood in terms of their relationships. Therefore, the following chapter will discuss the most common dilemmas and challenges that NGO's faces and how this affects their activities (and the local beneficiaries) and even their identity.

## 2 Theoretical framework

### 2.1 NGOs juggling between dilemmas, critics, challenges and trends

NGO's literature is vast, especially for Northern and/or international organisations. Petras (1999, p. 433), expresses his hard critics and extreme opinion that "NGOs, which are under subordinating relations, are a mere tool to spread and consolidate the imperialism and capitalism forces"<sup>14</sup>. More moderate voices, like Klees (1998, p. 49) state that "at their best, NGOs act as a progressive element in the dialectic of global and local, empowering individuals and communities to face, resist, and transform the unequal relations of neo-liberalism. However, NGOs may have initially grown within the cracks and fissures left by the unmet needs of a capitalist, patriarchal, and racist world system". Along with Klees, Edwards (1999; 2000) not only exposes the issues and dilemmas NGOs face, he also showcases and offers clues for alternatives and trends.

Inspired by NGOs literature<sup>15</sup>, the three most common critics are:

1) NGOs are (consciously or unconsciously) supporting and instilling forms of capitalism and imperialism. In some cases, they contribute to sustaining poverty or accentuating the differences between donors and recipients (Klees, 1998; Mitlin et al., 2007; Petras, 1999; Sianes, 2013; Smith, 2004; Townsend, Porter, & Mawdsley, 2002).

2) NGOs are largely donor economic dependant, therefore influenced and/or controlled by them as well (Lister, 1999; Mitlin et al., 2007; Molenaers, Dewachter, & Dellepiane, 2011; Petras, 1999; Sianes, 2013; Townsend et al., 2002; Wallace, 2009). In general, small and medium NGOs activities and subsistence depend on one or two donors, which facilitates the "project funding type" (Wallace, 2009, p. 209). Still, they are an important vehicle for obtaining and employing development funds (Klees, 1998, p. 49).

3) Frequently, NGOs work is based on "project-delivery services" or are "subcontractors" for short-term projects (Edwards, 1999, 2011; Molenaers et al., 2011; Sianes, 2013; Wallace, 2009). The current tendency is to shift from a "service-delivery" to "advocacy" ("leverage") (Edwards, Hulme, & Wallace, 1999; Fowler, 2000; Molenaers et al., 2011).

As a consequence, NGOs will easily tend to work in a top-down design and project processing (Edwards, 2011; Townsend et al., 2002). They are under the tyranny of structured audits, reports and constant transparency (Sianes, 2013; Townsend et al., 2002); they use buzz and buzzwords or misuse the language to impose similar policies on different poverties (Tvedt, 1998 and Clarke et al., 2000 in (Mitlin et al., 2007; Petras, 1999; Townsend et al., 2002). This facilitates the competition between NGOs (Sianes, 2013; Wallace, 2009); or create a misconnection between common troubles in the north and the south (Sianes, 2013).

Some authors, like Edwards, Lister and Molenaers (1999; 1999; 2011) mention the commonly existing dilemma identity as a result of diverging claims, interest and duties with different stakeholders. Molenaers et al. (2011) states, "To a certain extent, they are market institutions; who are expected to provide cost-effective services against alternative providers (development by delivery) and also claim to be social actors and drivers of transformation (development by leverage) (Edwards et al., 1999; Lewis, 2007, p. 40 in Molenaers et al., 2011, p. 191). Even if some NGOs claim that both type of development (by leverage and by delivery) are compatible and should be combined (Molenaers et al. 2011); Edwards et al. (1999, p. 131 in Molenaers, 2011) opinions that NGOs have to make a clear choice and go for only one.

Together with the identity dilemma, there is the constant need to ensure and build legitimacy (Molenaers et al., 2011; Sianes, 2013). Lister (2003 in Molenaers et al., 2011) recognises two types of legitimacy. First the technical type which is based on accountability, performance, and representativeness) and second, the

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<sup>14</sup> Other extreme opinions are that "NGOs often act against the will of committed actors, threatening the development of indigenous civil society or undermine democracy by taking social programs and public debate out of the control of the local people" (Mitlin, Hickey, & Bebbington, 2007, p. 1001; Petras, 1999, p. 434; Townsend, Porter, & Mawdsley, 2002).

<sup>15</sup> Read literature talks about NGOs in general; however, more information was found on Northern NGOs than the Southern NGOs.

sociological approach that argues that legitimacy is socially constructed and it depends on the perceptions of particular stakeholders.

Alongside the critics and dilemmas NGOs face today, their role and activities should be recognised and underlined as well. Their work and support allow concrete actions done in the field and local people can benefit from them (not only through delivery services projects, but also during punctual humanitarian assistance (Smith, 2004, p. 742)). NGOs create and strengthen actors of civil society while fostering the development of progressive social movements (Klees, 1998). Local NGOs are usually committed to social justice and grassroots activism (Klees, 1998). They play a significant role in producing public faces of development, not only through donors but to multiple stakeholder (e.g. press and media, research centres or the general public (Smith, 2004, p. 742)). Even if it was not clearly mentioned in the literature, NGOs (especially southern) are (miss) communicators of the realities and needs of the local people towards the (Northern) stakeholders. And when establishing international trade relations they can offer an alternative to purely commercial organisations.

## 2.2 Relationships, partnerships & power

“Development involves a great number of interactions between actors of different statuses, with varying resources and dissimilar goals”, says Olivier Sardan (2004, p.4 in Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 2). NGOs are in contact with stakeholders such as governments, funders, local beneficiaries, press and media, research centres, think-tanks, private sector, consumers and other actors. That means that their network can be vast and that degrees of complexity are added as the NGO extends their network. However, Mitlin *et al.* (2007, p. 1702) argue that NGOs can only be understood in terms of their relationship with more (constitutive) actors in society (e.g. the state and the market).

Townsend *et al.* (2002, p. 834) claims that “the aid system is a chain of dependency-inducing relationships (from international donor to local project), co-operation and solidarity are very hard to create and sustain, and partnership can be unequal, unfair, more of a master–servant relationship”. It is true in some cases, however is possible to achieve respectful and balanced relationships or a partnerships between one or more stakeholders if some basic ground rules are respected (Eade, 2007).

### 2.2.1 Partnerships

Eade (2007) affirms that a “successful and fair” partnership should include the following elements: a) mutual trust, complementary strengths, reciprocal accountability, joint decision making and a two-way exchange of information (Postma, 1994, p. 451 in Eade, 2007); b) clearly articulated goals, equitable distribution of costs and benefits, performance’ indicators and mechanisms to measure them, clear delineation of responsibilities and a process for adjudicating disputes (USAID, 1997, p. 1 in Eade, 2007); c) shared perceptions and a notion of mutuality with give-and-take (Tandon, 1990, p. 98 in Eade, 2007); d) mutual support and constructive advocacy (Murphy, 1991, p. 179 in Eade, 2007); and e) transparency with regard to financial matters, long-term commitment to working together and the recognition of other partnerships (Campbell, 1988, p. 10 in Eade, 2007). Some of the characteristics that can unbalance the partnership equality is when it is based on a one-way transfer of resources (e.g. financial or intellectual). As a consequence, the “receiver” partner’s functioning and dignity can debilitate, while the “donor” partner’s gain strength (Eade, 2007, p. 633).

For southern NGOs, a partnership with a northern NGOs is the most common type, followed by partnership with a donor agency. Fowler (2000 in Townsend *et al.*, 2002, p. 834) sees partnership as a ‘politically correct’ mode of relating, beyond what is possible with the best of intentions. “Some visionary Southern NGO leaders and their Northern counterparts argued that the terms of cooperation between Northern and Southern agencies must change from hierarchical donor-recipient or patron-client relationships to those of partnership” (Drabek, 1987; Elliot, 1987; Kajese, 1987; Nyoni, 1987 in Ashman, 2001, p. 76).

## 2.2.2 Power

Studying NGOs forms of power could be a complete subject for a thesis. In order to simplify the task, this thesis will study power as a form of control and change the behaviour. Specifically, how NGO EBs relations with other stakeholders are influenced by the forms of power and how it affects to the quinoa commercialisation and production.

Singelmann (1981), who studied the different structure of domination and the peasant movements in Latin America states that power is based on the ability to control large and relevant contingencies of the environment and/or means of subsistence.

Many theories of power are behavioural and explain how particular actions carried out by one person or a group will have visible consequences on the behaviour of other(s) (Pfeffer, 1997 in Eade, 2007, pp. 5–6). Most referred theories is the one by Dahl (1957) and Lukes (1978). Dahl declares that “A” has power over “B” in order that make “B” to do something that “B” would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957, pp 202-3 in Eade, 2007, pp 5-6). Power is composed of four elements: 1) base of power, which means the resources to influence “B’s” behaviour; 2) the means of power or the specific actions by which the resources can be used; 3) the scope of power which is the set of specific actions that “A” can get “B” to perform; and 4) the amount of power, that is the net increase in the probability of “B” actually performing some specific action due to “A” using its means of power (Dahl, 1957, pp 202-3 in Eade, 2007, pp 5-6).

Critics of Dahl have argued that “he only analysed concrete decisions, failing to recognise that power is not just a relationship between individuals, but sustained by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups” (Lukes, 1974, p22 in Eade, 2007, pp 5-6). Lukes noted that power may be exercised by shaping the needs of others, so in this case “B” acquire desires and actively pursue ends that are in “A’s” interests.

As explained by Raven (1990, pp. 496–503), the six direct “bases of power” are: 1) reward power, used to motivate the target to achieve an action or objective; 2) coercion or the threat of punishment imposed by the influencing agent; 3) legitimacy, built on a structural relationship between the influencing agent and the target; 4) expertise, base of power based on a superior knowledge or ability of the influencing agent. “It is not used to persuade the target. The target is expected to have faith that the influencing agent knows what is best. When expert power is used effectively, it avoids problems with legitimate power”, says French and Raven’s (1959, p. 155); 5) reference (or identification) power relays on the sense of mutual identity, “the target feels a sense of oneness with the agent” and the target wishes to see things similarly; and 6) informational or persuasion, is the information or logical argument that the influencing agent expose to the target in order to implement a change. If the target believes in an alternative position the informational power will be ineffective.

Raven (1990, p. 503), complement the direct bases of power with an indirect ways. For example, the power of appealing to the use or reducing of the power of a third party toward the target.

The present chapter started giving and overview of the NGOs’ most common critics: deliberated or not support capitalism and imperialism, being donor economic dependant shape their development missions and eventually internal organisation; and usually “project-delivery services” based. In addition, there is the constant dilemma for achieving and maintain legitimacy, and define a clear identity. The source of these critics and dilemmas comes from the nature of the NGO as an intermediary between development actors and due to its relations with the more constitutive actors.

The following section will illustrate the research questions and methodology used to analyse the relations of the Bolivian NGO Esperanza Bolivia with the most relevant stakeholders in the context of their leadership in the quinoa production and commercialisation in Yunchará. The study will: a) compare the critics and dilemmas exposed in the literature against the ones perceived in NGO EB; b) examine the NGO’s relations with the main stakeholders and compare them with Eade’s characteristics of “successful partnerships” and the different forms of power (based on the bases of power by French and Raven) used to encourage a change or an action. In this case, the production and commercialisation of quinoa.

### 3 Methodology and research question

#### 3.1 Background

In 2010, the Bolivian NGO Esperanza Bolivia, associated to the Belgian NGO Louvain Coopération, executed a project aiming at introducing quinoa as a solution for food security and economic sustainable development.

Since the beginning EB has led and controlled almost every step of the value chain. From the conception of the project, passing through the production and commercialisation. Besides, taking up an active role as intermediary among farmers and other stakeholders (e.g. government, sponsors, buyers), they aimed at creating and strengthening local economic associations.

In 2013, the Association of Quinoa producers in Yunchará was created with 20 farmers under the umbrella of two local NGOs (Esperanza Bolivia and PROMETA) and the support of the local government.

#### 3.2 Research questions

##### 3.2.1 Main research questions

Given the leadership taken by Esperanza Bolivia for the introduction of the quinoa in Yunchará and their initiative in creating and strengthening the local quinoa producers association (APROQUY):

- Are the relations between EB and the stakeholders influencing the local production and commercialisation?
- How does EB influence the process of the local quinoa production and commercialisation?
- Who are the other main stakeholders involved in the production and value chain and how they interact between them?

##### 3.2.2 Secondary research questions

- Which are the observed challenges and realities for the quinoa production and commercialisation in Yunchará? And how are the different stakeholders facing those challenges?
- Who exactly are stakeholders the association is working and cooperating with?
- After the creation of this association, which are possible consequences for the local production and consumption of the quinoa?

#### 3.3 Methodology

##### 3.3.1 Research tools

The main source of information was obtained through participant-observation within the Food Security and Environment team of Esperanza Bolivia from September first to November seventh 2014. The research was carried out based on two main activities. First, accompanying and supporting the staff during the workshops "Trainings in Food and Nutrition"<sup>16</sup> and second, observing Esperanza Bolivia's staff interaction with different stakeholders, i.e. quinoa (potential) farmers, quinoa (potential) consumers, local government representatives, Belgian NGO local staff and other institutions. Most of participation-observation activities took place at Yunchará (three to four days per week) and the rest of the time at EBs premises located at Tarija. Fortunately,

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<sup>16</sup> Trainings were given at schools during class hours. Esperanza Bolivia thought theoretical information (importance of a balanced diet, nutritional values of vegetables and quinoa) and practical recipes based on quinoa and vegetables were elaborated. The audience consisted of students, teachers, school directors and parents.

the working agenda of Esperanza Bolivia is in general full of diverse activities related to different stakeholders; which allowed by me to be present in events such as the: a) “7<sup>th</sup> Lamas and sub-products exhibition”; b) a cooking workshop (delivered by EB) “Recipes with llama meat and quinoa”; c) quinoa’s producers association meetings; d) on-site trainings for new quinoa farmers; e) payments to quinoa farmers<sup>17</sup>; f) visits to several producers’ plots; g) the distribution of quinoa seeds; g) and be present during the visit of the Belgian NGO partner.

In parallel, structured and unstructured one-to-one interviews were done with: a) Esperanza Bolivia employees, among them the director of the project and several on-field workers; b) Yunchará’s quinoa (potential) producers, which are or not part of the quinoa association; c) municipal government representatives; including Yunchará’s mayor, the person in charge of food security in Yunchará and the president of Yunchará’s council; d) staff from other three NGOs working in the zone, two local NGOs and one international NGO based in Tarija; e) two representatives of government institutions namely PROSOL<sup>18</sup> and the *Central Campesina*<sup>19</sup>; and f) workshop’s participants (teachers, school directors and parents). Interviews were carried out mostly face-to-face with a variable length (from of five minutes to one hour and a half). A minor number of interviews was realized or complemented by phone or during chat conversations while writing the thesis (see Annex with a detailed list of interviews).

Literature review<sup>20</sup> was used to understand the relations of the quinoa farmers and associations in Bolivia and the Andes, NGOs’ experience in the creation of associations and influence of the “quinoa boom” on the life of the peasants. In parallel, it was consulted literature about the common critics and dilemmas NGOs faces and the different bases of power. In addition, were consulted documents and reports published by national and international institutions (e.g. PROINPA Foundation<sup>21</sup>, The Bolivian institute of Foreign Trade (IBCE) or the Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nations).

### 3.4 Challenges and limitations

#### 3.4.1 Change of the thesis scope

In the beginning, the present thesis had the intention to study the multiple relations of the local quinoa association APROQUY’s with different stakeholders (e.g. NGO Esperanza Bolivia, NGO PROMETA, and the municipal government) and how these stakeholders perceived the quinoa association. The limited time spent with the quinoa farmers (during their daily activities and during the association’s gatherings) did not allow me to gather enough data and develop a relation of trust and open communication. There were not enough opportunities to discuss and observe their interaction with different stakeholders and their understanding of concepts such as solidarity, associations or empowerment, leadership. As a consequence the most logic and reasonable<sup>22</sup> was to place the NGO in the centre of the research and study its relations and influence on the production and commercialisation of quinoa in Yunchará. Therefore, the interviews had other objectives in the beginning, some small gaps appeared during the analysis. In order to fill these gaps and, as it was not possible to go back to field research, some interviews were carried-out by phone and on-line chats with some informants. However, these research tools limit the number of persons that could be reached<sup>23</sup>. As a result, the number of

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<sup>17</sup> Payment of their last production that EB commercialised in their behalf.

<sup>18</sup> Community Solidary Programme (PROSOL) has the mission to strengthen and give recognition to the community production and to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of the peasant and indigenes families in the Department of Tarija (PROSOL, s. d.)

<sup>19</sup> The *Centrales Campesinas* belongs to the Union of Peasants in Bolivia Confederation (CSUTCB). Founded in 1979, this is the maximum peasant authority and representation. Represented by a heavy structure of seven layers in the national, regional and local level (CSUTCB, s. d.).

<sup>20</sup> There are no journal’s articles related to the zone of study of the quinoa producers in this region. The only academic source of information of this region is the Internship report of the Belgian student Benoit Tichoux (2013).

<sup>21</sup> Bolivian non-profit organisation aiming to promote the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, sovereignty and food security, through research and technological innovation (PROINPA, 2014).

<sup>22</sup> Due to the portion of time spend with the NGO EB’s staff and the quality of the experiences.

<sup>23</sup> Interviewees of that region not only need a mobile phone, but also the willingness and time to talk, in addition they needed to be in a zone with good phone signal.

interview questions and interview length had to be adapted to the present situation (busy time schedule, willingness to spend time on lengthy explanations) of the interviewee. In addition, phone interviews do not allow the observation of non-verbal language.

### 3.4.2 Challenges related to sociocultural features and the geographical characteristics.

As it will be explained in detail afterwards, the region of Yunchará is a vast geographical zone. For reaching interviewees, in order to carry out interviews, one challenge was to overcome long distances. The distance between communities could go from a few minutes to several hours, and even if the distances are short, sometimes the road conditions do not allow going beyond over 30 km/hour. This has implications on daily life such as the time needed to move from one community to other could be more than two hours. In order to visit several communities, it was limited to the proximity in kilometres such as the transportation time. This affects the number of producers that could be visited within one working day. If a farmer could be visited<sup>24</sup>, the time spent took from five to forty minutes. This affected mainly the participant-observation and interviews with the quinoa farmers. This didn't allow much time to spend with them altogether, but which is needed to build enough trust for establishing a fluid conversation. The personality of highlands' peasants is rather reserved and mistrustful. All this adds a degree of challenge to establish an open conversation and to answer to the questions without diverting the subject.

The advantage of the long transportation periods allowed on the other hand more time with the on-field NGO staff and discussions with them (in group or individually) about a variety of subjects.

### 3.5 Possible bias and personal reflection

Even if the time spend with the NGO was short and the interaction to one EB team was limited, working every day belonging and representing the NGO for two months naturally created and strengthened the relations with the staff while being in the field. In the moment I took up rather a position as a field worker than a researcher. Of course this diminishes the neutrality needed as a researcher. What helped creating the necessary distance was the time passed and the local distance between the on-site experience and the time of writing.

Certainly, for the different stakeholders, I could have been considered as part of the NGOs staff<sup>25</sup>, despite that she presented herself as a student realising her internship and research in the zone. This could have possibly affected the answers to certain questions or their behaviour as not considering me a neutral person against the background of their personal or institutional interests.

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<sup>24</sup> Farmers are not always reachable due to their multiples activities (e.g. other farming activities, cattle, working outside the region). It is not used to call the farmer in advance and schedule a meeting. One explanation is that even if some of them have mobile phones, there is not efficient signal coverage or simply due to the life style of farmers. In some punctual situations, like an on-site training for new producers, it could be arranged face-to-face one week in advance. It happens that several trials must be done before meeting the farmer.

<sup>25</sup> It is expected due that I spent two months working with them and even wearing the "Esperanza Bolivia cap".

## 4 Case study: NGO Esperanza Bolivia's mosaic of relations and its influence on the production and commercialization of the quinoa in Yunchará

### 4.1 Zone of study

Yunchará municipality belongs to the second section of Avilés in the province of Tarija, at the South of Bolivia. The surface of 1 768km<sup>2</sup> holds 45 communities and has three ecological "levels": valley (below 2800 mamsl), "head of the valley" (between 2800 and 3200 mamsl) and highlands (between 3200 and 3800 mamsl).

The municipality has 5490 inhabitants and its population is significantly young<sup>26</sup> and economically active inhabitants represent 36%. Income generation in this area<sup>27</sup> mostly comes from agricultural activities (fava beans, onion, garlic, peaches, potatoes, etc.), livestock<sup>28</sup> (llama, sheep and goats) and to a small part, handicrafts (textile production base in llama and sheep wool) (Böhrt, 2009; « Censo de Población y Vivienda 2012 », 2012; Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a). In the case of agriculture, there are staples where a large percentage of the production is commercialised: 90% for garlic in the highlands, 70% of fruit in the "head of valley" and 68% of the vegetables in the valley (Gobierno Municipal de Yunchará, 2007, p. 19-20). In some cases, producers take their surplus to a closer village or city and sell it directly (Guerrero, 2014b).

Yunchará is considered a municipality highly vulnerable to food insecurity<sup>29</sup> and with high rates of child malnutrition<sup>30</sup> and a growing poverty in the department<sup>31</sup>. It was observed that the diet of the inhabitants is constituted by locally (self) produced foods (which vary depending the ecological "levels") and fresh, dried or processed foods that are purchased directly at Tarija or Villazón cities<sup>32</sup>, in the various small informal convenience stores in the communities and sometimes through informal vendors who travel those communities. Among the three ecological levels, people consume rice<sup>33</sup>, potatoes, dried wheat pasta, *mote*<sup>34</sup>, fava beans, onions, sun-dried sheep and llama meat (less frequently). The most common processed foods include sardines, a variety of sweets, puffed cereal, chips, jellies, soft drinks, sodas and alcoholic beverages. Esperanza Bolivia's nutritional workshop trainer and several teachers characterize the diet of Yunchará's families poor in nutrients and limited to local products<sup>35</sup>. Quinoa is not part of basic diet as it is not frequently consumed<sup>36</sup>. For families who do consume quinoa, there are two ways of receiving quinoa. Either they buy it in the city or they produce it. However, children have it for breakfast and for lunch as part of federal school food programmes.

Among various employees of the municipal government there are different perceptions about the potential and economic development of the region. In most cases, Yunchará is described as a "poor municipality" or "municipality with potential". NGOs working in the zone believe that there are still "plenty of improvement opportunities" (Guerrero, 2014b).

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<sup>26</sup> 44% of the population is under the age 19.

<sup>27</sup> In an independent study led by Böhrt (2009), the major income of Yunchará comes from migrants (41%) and agriculture is the fifth activity generating income (6.58%).

<sup>28</sup> Production designated to commercialisation (Gobierno Municipal de Yunchará, 2007, p. 22).

<sup>29</sup> Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) 4 (PMA, 2010 in Esperanza Bolivia, 2013c, p. 2)

<sup>30</sup> 32% (PMA, 2010 in Esperanza Bolivia, 2013c, p. 2).

<sup>31</sup> 98% (INE, 2010 in Esperanza Bolivia, 2013c, p. 2).

<sup>32</sup> The *Yunchareños* travel to the city in average once a month and for some lucky persons, twice a month. People working in the region (usually working for the local government and teachers) travel back to the city during the week-ends.

<sup>33</sup> Usually bought in large quantities in the city.

<sup>34</sup> Corn variety, white colour and bigger size than common type

<sup>35</sup> Almost all of the teachers surveyed felt that students' diet is much more balanced and complete thanks to the school breakfast and/or lunches provided with the support of the GMY, the Departmental Service of Social Management (SEDEGES) and international food programs such as the World Food Programme. Likewise, students performance and development of children has improved significantly since the introduction of menus and balanced meals.

<sup>36</sup> Mainly once or twice a month.

## 4.2 NGO Esperanza Bolivia

Esperanza Bolivia is a Bolivian non-governmental organization present in Bolivia since 1983 in Bolivia<sup>37</sup>, mainly in the Tarija and Chuquisaca Department.

The NGO's mission is to improve the quality of life for [Bolivian] needful families through health, education, environment, food security, human rights actions and holistic community development programs (Esperanza Bolivia, 2009). Their projects and activities are based on the values of: respect, honesty, solidarity, equity, excellency and sustainability in the organisation's actions (Esperanza Bolivia, 2009).

Esperanza Bolivia strategic objectives are: a) implementing interventions that improve the quality of life of the Bolivian population and comprehensive community development through projects in health, education, environment and housing; b) promote, implement and strengthen income-generating projects; c) develop activities that enable institutional and community human resources in the areas of health, education, housing, environment and community integral development; d) perform actions of political advocacy in favour of the defence of universal human rights and against violence and gender discrimination, racial, cultural and generational; e) establish strategic alliances with groups, organizations and associations of public and private sector, to implement programs and projects of greater impact. (Esperanza Bolivia, s. d.-b).

EB mainly carries out programmes on housing, health care (among them carrying out medical and surgical procedures, by foreign specialist and medical teams), and entrepreneurship. Other EB programmes promote healthy and sustainable environments, use of friendly technologies, sustainable productive development and sustainable community-based tourism projects. An important focus of EB's work is made of food security and environment programmes aiming at developing necessary conditions for beneficiary families to have physical, economic and cultural access to highly nutritious foods.

One of the working departments of EB is the Food Security and Environment Team (SAMA). The team is composed of a project coordinator; a person in charge of the commercialisation and vegetables promotion; one on-field expert; a temporary nutritionist<sup>38</sup>; an administrator; and a driver. It was observed that the SAMA team comprises of different strengths such as high professional approach, an empiric view, scientific knowledge; strong agro-economic view with members highly committed to their job respectfully treating any stakeholders. The team seems to act political neutral with a flexible attitude and problem solving. On field team is known and easily recognise by quinoa farmers, for example, the driver worked in the "viviendas project", so he is remembered by his work and he know also who is who. Likewise for the nutritionist, who worked before in the region giving workshops to process fava beans and who's family is from the region. It facilitated the relation and openness with the local inhabitants.

Its main funders are Esperança Inc, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Smile Train Organisation, the Belgian Development Agency, the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme. Among their partners are: national and international NGOs and international development agencies, such as Louvain Cooperation (LC)<sup>39</sup>, Foundation for the Sustainable Development (FUNDESO)<sup>40</sup>, Programme of Integral Health Coordination (PROCOSI)<sup>41</sup> and United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and national governmental institutions such as the Tarija and Chuquisaca's Department of Health Service (SEDES-Tarija and SEDES-Chuquisaca); Department government of Tarija; and, last but not least, the Autonomous municipal governments such as Villamontes, Yunchará, Camargo, Culpina and O'Connor (Esperanza Bolivia, s. d.-a).

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<sup>37</sup> EB started working in Bolivia as an International NGO depending of the network of Esperança Inc. (based in USA). In 1997, the NGO EB became a subsidiary of Esperança Inc. and established their own board and internal organisation and rules. EB claims that even if they receive financial and technical support from Esperança Inc., they are free to choose the projects to develop and necessary partnerships (Esperanza Bolivia, 2009).

<sup>38</sup> Working in the team on punctual bases, in this case during the workshops "Trainings in Food and Nutrition".

<sup>39</sup> Located in Belgium.

<sup>40</sup> Located in Spain.

<sup>41</sup> Located in Bolivia.

### 4.3 Esperanza Bolivia's food security and economic security projects

The first cooperation project between Esperanza Bolivia and Louvain Coopération, regarding food security and economic security development, started in August 2010 and ended in July 2013. The project aimed to promote economic, social and nutritional development of families in the municipalities of El Puente and Yunchará, by introducing quinoa<sup>42</sup> (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a, p.1). Project's main objectives were to develop the local capacity for production, management and commercialisation of the quinoa; and, integrate the consumption of quinoa among the family diet, especially for children below two years. Among the achievements are: identification of the quinoa varieties with higher adaptability and production performances and the calculation of the production costs and comparison of the quinoa cultivation profits against other local staples production and commercialisation of the harvested quinoa is supported and the consumption of quinoa among the quinoa farmers is initiated. The project was also aiming at supporting and encouraging the creation of local quinoa producers associations.

After the first three years project (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a, p. 40) main conclusions drawn from that experience were: that research is needed on water sources and their potential and availability in the area that could increase yields and ensure the production, especially in times of drought. Another recommendation was to continue creating institutional synergies in order to promote the cultivation of quinoa and to join efforts for avoiding duplication of actions and demonstrate that the cultivation of quinoa is a competitive alternative within the theme of sustainable food security. Another observation was the importance to strengthen the quinoa association. Emphasis should be put on formation of business units and strengthening local capacities for production, management and marketing of quinoa, create products with higher added value while considering the different varieties of quinoa for processing. Also suitable production techniques should be acquired to accompany the processing line and conservation of quinoa.

The second and current project, the Project SAES<sup>43</sup>, started last January 2014 and will end in December 2016. This project aims at contributing to local economic and nutritional improvement through the enhancement of two production chains (quinoa and non-traditional vegetables) with important commercial and nutritional value. NGO EB's key actions related to the associations are to strengthen the local government for developing, implementing and monitoring strategic plans linked to the Productive Revolution Law (law 144) provide technical assistance to the current associations to become conform with the Productive Revolution Law (law 144) and convert them in Community Economic Organisations or Active Producers Associations; train the production unities regarding the good agricultural and manufacturing practices; conform mixed associations to provide of rural business services (collecting and distribution of the merchandize, marketing and commercialization), provide technical assistance and direct support of marketing action and deliver trainings on nutritional value of the quinoa and vegetables for women groups, students and their families.

### 4.4 Deconstructing Esperanza Bolivia's relations and partnerships

As mentioned above, EB has established relationships to a multitude of institutions and personalities: local governments, agro-industry, research institutes, founders, peasants, press and media. However, this analysis will focus on main stakeholders of the quinoa project which are the Belgian NGO Louvain Coopération (intermediary between the main funder, DGD), the municipality of Yunchará (material funder, partner and beneficiary) and the quinoa farmers (beneficiaries).

In this section the bases of power in the relation and partnership features between Esperanza Bolivia and the main project's actors are analysed. In addition, it will explain the different dilemmas they face and the complexity of those relationships.

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<sup>42</sup> Due for its high nutritional value and profitability and increased market demand.

<sup>43</sup> In Spanish: Seguridad Alimentaria y Económica Sustentable. In English: Food and Economic Sustainable Security.

#### 4.4.1 NGO Esperanza Bolivia and NGO Louvain Coopération (LC)

*“[Esperanza Bolivia] is one of the partners with higher technical and management quality. Considered as strategic to implement initiatives”*

*Paolo Femia, Louvain Coopération Bolivia*

(Van Waeyenberge, 2014)

The Belgian NGO Louvain Coopération (LC) has been a partner of Esperanza Bolivia and an intermediary between the donors (Belgian Development Agency for this project) and EB for over 12 years.

Louvain Coopération is a non-governmental organization of the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve. It applies academic know-how to resolve problems concerning developmental cooperation. Since 1981, the aim of this NGO is to fight against hunger, disease and poverty of the most disadvantaged populations in eight southern countries in Africa, South America and Asia (Louvain Coopération, s. d.). LC has a regional office in La Paz (Bolivia). The local LC's expert acts as an intermediary between EB and the LD's headquarters in Belgium and he visits EB (in average) every three months.

LC's projects are funded by public and private organisations. Public funders are the Belgian Development Cooperation, Belgian Fund for Food Security, European Union, Wallonie-Bruxelles International and Brabant Wallonia region. Private funding comes from the Catholic University of Louvain, National Lottery or Coalition against the Hunger (Louvain Coopération, s. d.).

The LC's food and economic security programme is based on five pillars: reinforcement of capacities, food security, economic security, environment respect and capitalisation<sup>44</sup> (Louvain Coopération, 2012, p. 1). Food and Economic Security Expert, Vincent Henin, explains the funding procedure as follows. At first, the LC Strategic Frame is shared by the headquarters with the regional offices and afterwards shared with the partners (Vincent Henin, 2015). “EB presents the idea we (EB and LC) complete, correct and validate the proposition that it is presented to the General Direction for the Cooperation to Development and Humanitarian Help<sup>45</sup> and other private funders.”, says Henin (2015).

LC's pillars were adopted by EB for the establishment of the project's objectives. For example: LC's documents states that in order to achieve “Institutional strengthening: management skills of the development actors (partners and beneficiaries), reinforcement of local government in the elaboration, application and follow-up of strategic plans for the [law of ] Agriculture Productive Revolution, technical assistance to current producers associations in their adaptation to the law of Agriculture Productive Revolution explain law”, at EB's documents states “Strengthening management skills of the three project actors (executers, alliances and beneficiaries) that will increase the project quality and local governance. At the end of the project: the executers has improved the technical and management of the implementation of the project, the municipal government has the strategic plans for the Agriculture producers revolution, and 90% of the conformed association works under the law of Agriculture Productive Revolution” (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013b; Louvain Coopération, 2012).

LC considers EB as a partner. EB refers to them as a partner as well but from time to time, also as “funders”. It was observed that both institutions have mutual trust, complementary strengths, and consider each other accountable. For example LC provides access and contact to funders, know-how in reporting, measuring, policy, global vision and strategy. EB is recognized locally and nationally as creator of (scientific) knowledge and as broker between north and local stakeholders with established relations with the local government. This partenaria can be based on short-length projects with clear and measurable goals, milestones and performance indicators. There is a mandatory transparency on financial matters and strict formatted reporting and

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<sup>44</sup> Understood as “the capitalised experiences and learning create a product and services portfolio for the development and business promotion.

<sup>45</sup> In French : Direction générale Coopération au développement et Aide humanitaire (DGD)

traceability of actions<sup>46</sup>. However, due of the nature of their relation (donor-beneficiary), no equitable distribution takes place (in the case of food security).

Last but not least, LC recognises EB's partnerships with other institutions. LC officially recognise synergies of EB with the government of Yunchará and the complementary work with other institutions: SEDAG, SENASAG, PAM and PROMETA<sup>47</sup> (Louvain Coopération, 2012). In a first glance based on Eade's characteristic of partnership, it can be concluded that their relation is solid, generally fair but still strongly influenced by the donor-beneficiary features.

From the power distribution point of view, "complementarity" and "resemblance" between both institutions can be observed. However there is a constant need and pressure for EB to ensure their legitimacy.

Both institutions base their resemblance by the power of reference. Both believes that an increase of income will allow people to eat better and as a consequence be healthier (development by economic means) and that quinoa is a pertinent solution for food safety and economic development. They also join the same vision of project and ownership transfer (at the beginning the NGO will take the lead and at the end just support the beneficiary who owned the project). It is however difficult to estimate, if EB already shared the same believes as LC or if they were just adopted for the first food security project. It can be assumed that after twelve years of partnership EB has adopted them in the meantime.

EB and LC relation reached a complementarity through the powers of expertise and legitimacy. In the case of the expertise, LC possesses the contacts and know-how for funding requests, donor reportings, audits and global policies. EB has the expertise of working in the zone, being able to estimate the realities and challenges<sup>48</sup>, experience in the agriculture field<sup>49</sup>, requesting international funds and reporting, but also have developed valuable scientific knowledge and technology transfer strategy<sup>50</sup> that benefits EB and LC.

Legitimacy power is a complex issue between EB and LC. On the one hand, EB has been recognised as legitimate thanks to their professional working methods, proper project management and achievement of objectives. Legitimacy is given by LC but also by other stakeholders like the local government. On the other hand, LC has earned its legitimacy from their donors thanks to EBs work<sup>51</sup>. The importance of legitimacy is more important than other bases of power. A lack of legitimacy in this case would lead to a stop of the project and distrust between both institutions. "For example, if a project does not achieve the expected results<sup>52</sup>, it would lead to a review of methods and in the most extreme situation a termination of the cooperation", says Henin from LC. Another example that supports the importance of legitimacy is that for the second project EB played a "safety card". Henin from LC Belgium mentioned "We believe that the new project was added to the vegetables production and commercialisation chain, for one reason. EB wants to reduce the risk for the project management, so it was a question of risk management. EB realized that after three years, distances are still long, the volume of production is small, only little number of farmers producing quinoa and the expected production volume has not been met. (Therefore) EB added a new component, [...], with an association that has already an economic network and an established not far from an urban centre".

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<sup>46</sup> Several times the General Manager remind to the on-field team to track and keep a proof of the visits to the farmers (could be a note saying that the passed and add some observations). In some occasion local team was not feeling worth it, one confessed to me "we cannot left a note when there is no one at home, a paper can flew easily". Another example that may sound extreme was to fulfil the workshop participation lists in blue ink and not black, "to avoid that someone believes that are photocopies".

<sup>47</sup> SEDAG: Departmental Service of Agricultural Development; SENASAG: National Service for the Food Security and Animal Salubrity; PAM: UN Food Programme; PROMETA: NGO Environmental Protection of Tarija.

<sup>48</sup> I.e. Environmental, limited water, personality of the inhabitants.

<sup>49</sup> On-field team, project coordinator and general manager are agronomist or biologist with several years of experience in the agricultural sector.

<sup>50</sup> EB has realised a conference paper on a three years research about adaptation of quinoa varieties in Yunchará, and participated as a speaker in the conference. In addition, EB has edited two guides of quinoa cultivation in the region, developed and adapted production techniques from other regions to Yunchará and edited one recipe book with quinoa recipes adapted to the local preferences.

<sup>51</sup> And other local partners of LC.

<sup>52</sup> Apparently, the number of quinoa farmers and cultivated surface was not as high as expected, as the rise of volume.

Another observed forms power involved observed are informational power from LC to EB<sup>53</sup>. During the visit of LC to EB, it was mentioned by LC that from 2017, the Belgian development policy will support private sector, especially the Belgian private sector. Coercive power from LC to EB. It was not observed any kind or type of violence or abuse from LC, but there was a perceived stress and pressure before and during the visit of LC (i.e. showcase the best farmers plots, prepare the documents and reports requested by LC).

Coming back to the critics mentioned before regarding the NGOs, that they support and install forms of capitalism and imperialism. The project considers economic development as a way to diversify the diet (eat also quinoa) and improve the family income with the sales of quinoa. Quinoa was chosen due to its economic value and facility to grow. From the EB's documentation can be assumed that production is meant to come in large quantities (enough to cover family consumption and commercialisation) and commercialisation by intermediaries and buyers. Local exchange or alternative distribution channels to sell to consumers were not considered at all<sup>54</sup>. Another critic is that NGOs provide only project-delivery services and work in a top-down design and processing. Indeed, the project was realized with partners and socialised with beneficiaries after it was accepted. Also during an internal meeting of EB, it was mentioned to think about a future project, to be open to a new subject. Another common critic is the NGOs are the communicators of the realities and needs of the local people towards the (Northern) stakeholders, and in some cases information is lost on the way. During this short research, I cannot confirm any conscious or unconscious manipulation of the realities, actions and results. Reading the report prepared by LC to the donor (DGD) were observed that communication is adapted to the target. For example, the report delivered by LC to DGD is more project management oriented, technical information, based on results measurements and key points.

It could be observed that EB and LC keep an open communication, both are aware of some of the challenges that the quinoa project faces. For example, the individualist way to work of the quinoa farmers or the risk that farmers do not consume what they produce and only sell the production.

LC Belgium had expressed towards myself an interest to know why *quinueros* resist to produce quinoa<sup>55</sup>. So for LC it seems important to analyse those issues more deeply. Their second concern, is the long term sustainability of the project. For example, if the production increases and *quinueros* decide to sell their complete harvest or if local government don't have the possibility to offer competitive prices to the farmers and intermediaries.

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<sup>53</sup> It can be assumed that this power could be on both directions and not only one direction (from LC to EB). For example, EB can have privilege information about local government policies or plans that can affect the project. During the fieldwork non were observed.

<sup>54</sup> From an economic point of view, there is no interest to commercialise quinoa among family or local consumers, because there is no significant demand. Production is expensive and not part of the normal diet. Beside the commercialisation costs and efforts will be higher.

<sup>55</sup> They have some ideas, like farmers resistance to grow a new staple.

#### 4.4.2 Yunchará's Municipal government

*“Esperanza presented us the project, it was interested and we adopted it. We (EB and GYM) had evaluated the best varieties for the region and we (EB and GYM) are supporting the association”*

*Gladys Alarcón, Mayor of Yunchará*

*(« Interview with Gladys Alarcon - Government of Yunchará », 2014)*

The municipality of Yunchará (GMY/MY) is governed by Gladys Alarcón, a young and dynamic woman from Yunchará. She belongs to the MAS party, the same as the president. It could be observed that the local government embrace the president's government policy and ideals of giving power and voice to peasants.

Through interviews with several local government workers it became clear that they applauded and followed Alarcón's vision of regional economic development strategy. This strategy emphasizes on increasing the value of local products by producing and selling sub-products. “The owner of the idea or project is where it was created”, says Olver Cabello, Food Security Expert of GMY, referring that in comparison to neighbour municipalities, Yunchará has gained some markets being the first one selling processed items, such as the fava bean. The government has invested and continues to invest in local fava bean, llama meat and goat's cheese processing factories and handcrafts workshops. For them, in one or two years the quinoa farmers should start selling quinoa *beneficiada* and sub-products. Emphasis is also put on investment in youth potential and education. The major recently opened a centre of technical education with three main courses: tourism, agriculture and cattle management. For Alarcón, it is essential to bring back the youth to work in the region instead of having them migrate economically. Another strategy aims to increase municipal revenues through tourism. Several exhibitions like the llama exhibition, local wine tasting<sup>56</sup> or the trade and exchange fair were organised. The region offers some beautiful spots such as the Lagunas of Tajará and a hiking trail

It was observed that the local government has good and close relations with several NGOs and institutions working in the zone: Plan International, PROMETA or Esperanza Bolivia to name a few. It is highly possible that as many other local instances, they depend on international and national funding in order to run projects supporting the economic development and health. In case of Esperanza Bolivia, they have been working together for several years. One of the main projects here was the “*viviendas project*”<sup>57</sup>, a project on housing.

In 2010, EB and MY have established a partnership for the quinoa project. The major mentions that EB presented her the project and that MY has “adopted it” (« Interview with Gladys Alarcon - Government of Yunchará », 2014). When related to the project, they frequently use “we”, to refer to the collaboration of EB and the GMY. The relation between institutions is complex, the government acts as a donor (funding some material elements and salaries of some on-field experts), an executive partner (supporting and guiding the local association) and as beneficiary (the project aims to strength government development plans and institutional skills). In order to officialise this partnership, EB and GY signed an agreement on common and independent objective, performance indicators, clear responsibilities and a process for adjudicating disputes and clear distribution of costs and benefits (EB is covering 75% of the project costs<sup>58</sup>). To add a degree to the complexity, the on-field team (paid by the GY) face in some cases the dilemma of “showing their loyalty” to the GY, even if they work at the NGOs office and stay all the time with them. The dilemmas are very subtle, for example, if the on-field worker decides not to participate in the parties or gathering organized by local government staff<sup>59</sup> or do not compel to the “government office” rules or the “boss” the salary can be “frozen” for a couple of weeks (for example). It seems that this has become a way of manipulation “accepted” and “tolerated”. On the contrary, EB didn't treat on-field staff even if was paid by GMY differently. The staff paid by GY (in

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<sup>56</sup> In the valley the produce and consume a very sweet red wine, *vino patero*.

<sup>57</sup> Under national and international funds, 735 houses were improved from 2007 to 2011 in Yunchará. The objective was to improve housing in order to avoid gastro-intestinal, chagas and respiratory diseases. Houses have a ceiling that avoid animals to stay and reproduce, separate the sleeping areas from kitchen and lavatories.

<sup>58</sup> EB receives the funds from LD and in this case EB engages a similar role as LC.

<sup>59</sup> Very frequently (several times a week), local government staff joins to « hang out » after the working hours.

appearance to me) receives the same treatment than the rest of the staff and while meeting the farmers the person usually presents itself as working for EB.

During the fieldwork there were no meetings between the government and EB representatives to discuss about the project, therefore the impressions of power bases in the relations are based in the observed comments during few interactions and experiences shared by EB and GYM staff.

The relation of EB and GMY is marked by similar features (reference base of power) and complimentary (expertise and legitimacy bases of power). Both institution share the same believes, like quinoa production is seen as an alternative for food security and economic development, both are owners and partners of the project<sup>60</sup> and they see the need to strengthen the quinoa association. Expertise power complements both institution, once again EB benefits from the scientific knowledge and know-how of quinoa production and the local government from EBs general overview of Yunchará's food security situation and the management of projects of agriculture infrastructure. Legitimacy base of power is also complex and in a way linked to the sense of ownership. The government of Yunchará receives legitimacy from inhabitants<sup>61</sup> and EB from the previous projects executed in the zone and also of the privilege position of being the contact with international stakeholders such as LC. In so far, EB needs the endorsement and support of GYM to run projects and the GMY needs the support of the NGO to ignite devolvement in the region.

Reward power it is a very delicate issue. EB uses award power when GMY is the beneficiary (for example, supporting their strategic plans). It was observed that in some moments EB was expecting to benefit from the good relation and partnership with GMY, this in very punctual moments and linked to two events. For example, one was during the Llama exhibition where EB received a well located exhibition booth (beside the podium) It is difficult to define these exchanges of favours due to the fact that in Latin America it is culturally very common to do small favours to maintain good relations. However, these could be used as a manipulative tool as well.

#### 4.4.3 Quinoa farmers and APROQUY (local quinoa association)

“We own ourselves to the *quinueros*, without them this project will not exist”

Sergio Martinez, General Manager of SAES team, Esperanza Bolivia

Quinoa farmers are located across the municipality of Yunchará in 18 different communities among the “head of valley” and the highlands.

The numbers of farmers has doubled since the beginning to the first project; however, the outcome was not as much as expected by LC and EB. It is important to highlight that farmers is the economic value of the grain, the “facility” to grow it and the success of a peer. Some farmers will do not grow grain due to the risk of cultivating a new staple, limited access to irrigation systems, a limited total surface of cultivable plots per farmer as they also have to manage their plot to grow food for their family and economic activity.

Quinoa is first valued by its high economic value. Family food security and nutritional benefits come in a second place. Farmers usually consume it (if they have) in soups, stews or *graneada*<sup>62</sup>. EB's on-field expert mentioned, “some farmers had sown for three years, even if they do not harvest or just a little, they continue.

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<sup>60</sup> It is possible that as both are “owners” there could be disputes or disagreements due to different approaches of working on agendas. However, the author neither did not perceive any disagreements nor heard of any. However, one of the contacts in the GMY mentioned that in the past, some outside institutions had introduced a potato variety that grew faster but could not be stored for long periods, compared to endogenous varieties. He complained that many farmers stopped producing the endogenous variety in order to produce more and sell it. Unfortunately it wasn't possible to ask both parties how they have understood the shared ownership of this project.

<sup>61</sup> During the last elections, 75% voted for the major (Gladys Alarcon facebook account, 2015)

<sup>62</sup> Cooked like rice.

Money motivates them”. Among the interviewees, no one had consumed quinoa on a frequent base prior the project.

The Association of quinoa producers in Yunchará (APROQUY) was found in 2012 with the support and encouragement of NGOs EB and PROMETA, and the endorsement of the GMY. Not all farmers belong to the quinoa association. EB, PROMETA and the MY encourage farmers to join the association. Exceptionally, the farmers from the head of valley were not able to join due to long geographical distances. EB project coordinator believes that one day they should join as well.

Some of the objectives of the association (APROQUY) are to: promote the recovery and reuse of socially productive agricultural areas, maintaining a balance between exploitation and conservation; rescue and collect information cultural nature related to the experience and knowledge of the rural population about the operation and control of traditional agricultural systems in order to recover and value cultural identity; strongly support the processing and marketing of products and derivatives of these agricultural areas; or promote members economic and social cooperation<sup>63</sup> (APROQUY, s. d.).

APROQUY’s board is composed by a president, vice, president, secretary, treasurer and one member or representative of each community. The board does not receive any payment for their two year mandate (APROQUY, s. d.). All the association members’ meet once a year at the general assembly and several times a year<sup>64</sup>, the board and community representatives meet to discuss particular subjects such as the coordination of a tractor, the harvest and processing. Finally this year, the associations received their official recognition (thanks to the support of EB and PROMETA).

Even if EB and PROMETA support APROQUY economically and morally, both institutions insist on the fact that “the association belongs to the farmers, and that farmers should work for it”. Several times EB recognized and supported APROQUY’s initiative to request support from the government to maintain the communal tractor and receive priority in using it in order to harvest on time. The report of LC (2015) to their donors states that during the latest agricultural campaign, APROQUY themselves looked for new farmers, selected the plots, planned the tractor schedule and supported the harvesting and post-harvesting commercial activities.

Most of the relation of EB and the quinoa farmers are maintained by the on-field team (the quinoa expert and the driver if present). It was observed that EB looks for an open, clear, direct and respectful communication. Even if in the past they had a negative experience or a sentiment of mistrust<sup>65</sup>. EB’s staff trust the word of the *quineros*. For example, in the first three years they worked together to test different quinoa varieties. The relation between them can be described not as a partnership, but rather a donor-beneficiary relation.

Before analysing the relation between EB and the farmers, two important points should be stated. First, as Raven (1990, p. 503) mentions, there are indirect ways to complement the bases of power, for example using or enhancing the use of power of a third party. EB’s on-the field activities together with the quinoa farmers are supported by PROMETA<sup>66</sup> and the GMY (apart from the institutional endorsement). The way EB cooperates with these institutions creates confusion for many farmers; to them often it is not clear who among the three organisations is in charge of which responsibilities. They just know that representatives of the three work with them and support them in different ways and that they can address to them for several issues. The second point is the constant need of NGO EB to remain legitimate towards LC and the government of Yunchará. This will also influence the power bases used towards the farmers and create some dilemmas and contradictions.

While analysing the relation between EB and the quinoa farmers<sup>67</sup> through the bases of power it can be observed that EB uses the bases of power of expertise and legitimacy to gain trust and respectability. The reference base of power was used during the research period with the farmers; and the award base of power to

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<sup>63</sup> Curiously, quinoa per se was never mentioned in the objectives of the association.

<sup>64</sup> It could from every month to every three months.

<sup>65</sup> For example, “The people from Chorcuya are liars and not to be trusted. We have given them seeds for two years in a row but they do not sow” (« Interview with EB staff », 2014)

<sup>66</sup> PROMETA’s support is based on an informal agreement, and started when both on-field experts of the institutions decided to support each other. At one certain moment, EB was upset because PROMETA edited one quinoa production manual that from EBs point of view was a copy of the manual owned by EB. However, they continue to collaborate.

<sup>67</sup> The analysis will be done for the quinoa partners, if there is a relevant note for APROQUY, it will be mentioned.

encourage the farmer and association to grow quinoa and achieve their objectives (i.e. number of parcels and surfaces cultivated).

EB expertise comes from their staff qualifications and is also gained through the project. On-field team considers that in general farmers are open to learn and care about their plot<sup>68</sup>. In some cases, there is resistance against what EB teams suggest due to farmers beliefs. One of the staff mentioned once “farmers do what we tell them, but sometimes they do not like taking out the weed. We insist on respecting the dosages of pesticides, but sometimes the farmer thinks that a bit more of a product will work better” (Interview with the staff, Esperanza Bolivia, 2014). In some cases, even if farmers are aware of EB expertise, they still start preparing his land or sowing quinoa based on their own experience<sup>69</sup>. As a result, in some cases when EB checks the parcel, it is not prepared ideally for the plants’ growth. But in order to reach that and fulfil standards, the NGO has to suggest small changes or adaptations. In terms of knowledge transfer, EB edited the manual for quinoa production, nevertheless, during the trainings the information was given orally and mainly focused on sowing (objective of the training). One big challenge EB is constantly confronted with is the demand to spread all needed information among farmers. EB prefers transferring the knowledge little by little. When it was suggested to train one farmer to support them during field visits or for the future of the association, one EB staff suggested that if the on-field expert shared all his knowledge, his job may be compromised.

The legitimacy of EB is based on their role as supporter or higher entity and also benefits the endorsement and support of the GMY. This legitimacy not only allows EB to “socialise” the project but also (together with PROMETA and MY) to convince and endorse local farmers of creating an association.

The reward base of power is frequently used by EB (as part of the non-structured strategy with GMY and PROMETA) with the objective to encourage and support the farmer’s production, association development and commercialisation of the quinoa. The organisations do not coordinate or have a clear strategy of how awards will be distributed<sup>70</sup>. The type of award can be material and non-material. Material awards include seeds, fertilisers, chemical pest control material, warehouse space, fuel for the tractor. Non-material awards are technical on-site support, guidance in the official proceedings of formalizing an association or support during commercialisation, harvesting and post-harvesting logistics. Occasionally the use of awards can affect the association added-value negatively. For example, within being or not member of the association the farmers could benefit from the support and services of EB, because was in the quinoa project. Apparently the association complains non-members receive the same privilege as members. Therefore EB has found a conciliating solution, they continue supporting farmers and ask them to join APROQUY. In some few moments, EB’s team mentioned that there is no recognition from the part of the farmers about all the efforts and help provided by EB, for example the time expend for technical visits or in some cases material support. The perceived need of recognition, was not to be publically recognise, more to be valued<sup>71</sup>.

Even though in some occasions the farmers do not respect the agreements stated with EB (i.e. not saving seeds for next agriculture campaign, or abandoning the plot), the NGO has never used coercive base of power to prevent the actions nor to react after them.

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<sup>68</sup> Of course, there is an influence depending on the farmer’s personality.

<sup>69</sup> It was identified that in some regions farmers are more proactive. They will not wait to see if a tractor is contracted or wait another two weeks before sowing. On the other side, some communities will wait to receive instructions or respect the schedule established by EB. The on-field team has the opinion that maybe proactive farmers are tired of non-realised promises or not used to receive help.

<sup>70</sup> There is communication between institutions but not in a structured way. For example PROMETA will deliver seeds and train new farmers. EB will discover it while visiting the farmers a week after. It was perceived that the reason behind is because “things must be done, and sometimes in the moment. It is not really important by who”.

<sup>71</sup> Based in APROQUY’s meeting acts. In some cases is written the material support received from PROMETA or EB (i.e. office material, seeds). Concerning the institutional support (i.e. legalising the association) it is mostly considered as and “activity” done or responsibility of EB and PROMETA. There were no traces about the time expend from the NGO nor the logistic support to realise the meeting.

Another perceived socio-cultural factors that influence the relations and project development are weak leadership from the part of EB and GMY, the paternalist/protectionism culture, individual working approaches and possible beliefs behind commercial spirit<sup>72</sup>.

EB and GMY mentioned that one of the main issues with associations and farmers in general was the individualist mind. Apparently the inhabitants of Yunchará can work and cooperate for punctual request or common interests/objectives. For example, when requesting material support from the PROSOL. Also can work in associative forms to defend their peasants/inhabitants rights through the *Centrales* and *subcentrales campesinas*, groups of scholar support, potable water and health committees, Mothers clubs<sup>73</sup>, producers associations, security committee, Community development centres, among others (Böhrt, 2009; Gobierno Municipal de Yunchará, 2007, p. 25). The position of EB and GMY can be understood from the point of view of why farmers join an association. During the interviews, it was perceived that farmers to join the quinoa association to get an immediate and short term support for the production (i.e. seeds, pest control, technical aid), only the board members mentioned “to have a stronger voice” or “to benefit of being an association”. The discourse is quite different from the arguments given by EB and YM of why farmers should creat or join the association: “Benefit for grants and government help”, “being included in the local strategic planning”, “being recognized as an economic entity”.

Similar perceptions between the farmers and EB (PROMETA and the GMY) were done found when all of them mentioned that the association needed support to start and that from 1 to 3 years should be autonomous. In several moments EB, PROMETA and GMY used the same expression “it is like a kid who is learning to walk”. However, recently one informant mentioned that the GMY is concerned of the weak structure of associations, even the stronger one like handcrafts (15 years) and cattle (8 years). Last but not least, EM and the GMY consider that sustainability and independence will be the result of an increased and constant production. Which again is a form of stablished legitimacy standards from a stronger party.

EB relations’ “deconstruction” can be analysed as follows. EB’s relation with partners benefit from delimited structure and certain balance. Within LC and GMY the resemble (power of reference) and complement and balance (expertise, legitimacy, informational). However, even if there is an apparent solid base for long terms relationships the need to maintain legitimacy creates pressure among EB and its staff. Without that legitimacy, EB could lose future funding and in the worst case the jobs of the SAMA team.

EB benefits from the support of the GMY and PROMETA to realise their projects in the Yunchará region through the bases of power of award, expertise and legitimacy. Quinoa farmers may see a “block of institutions” which have power and constantly share the same visions such as “growing and eating quinoa is good for your family and economy” or “you will be stronger if you associate”

A continuous and non-coordinated use of awards has several consequences. Farmers become used to receiving without the notion of “paying back” or “giving back”. In addition, they may not always appreciate all the support/incentives they receive and finally, a notion of “superior power” and “dependence” is thus reinforced.

#### 4.5 Esperanza Bolivia’s influence in the quinoa production and commercialisation

Evidently the influence on the Yunchará’s quinoa production and commercialisation comes from the project lead by Esperanza Bolivia. The objective is to examine how the bases of power between EB’s and the other stakeholders impact the production and commercialisation of the grain. Based on the previous analysis, internal documents of EB, personal observations and interviews it was deduced that the impact of EB in Yunchara’s quinoa production and commercialisation could be set in three main axes: the lead and execution of the project

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<sup>72</sup> During some interviews, contacts (any of them farmers) mentioned to me that “farmers do not have entrepreneurial vision”, “peasants for long time did not have the right to produce economically for them, only to work for other”, “peasants now have the power and means to develop things, but do not know how”.

<sup>73</sup> Mother clubs are places where mothers gather together. Most of the time they are based beside the schools and their activities varies, but in general they agenda aims to improve the life of the local families, in some cases they benefit from government subsidies like a communal oven. It has been the case that the *centros de madres* become productive cooperatives.

SAES, the introduction of a new economic activity and the influence in the beneficiaries lifestyle and personal development.

#### 4.5.1 EB's lead and execution of the project SAES

The idea to introduce quinoa in Yunchará belongs to EB, as well as the strategy to start the production, commercial expansion and to socialise the event to the local government and farmers. Given the leading role of EB, they have freedom of decision making (within the framework allowed by the funders, including the local government); EB decides about the objectives and key actions, but also has the option to choose the commercial channel or transferring its scientific knowledge.

Based on my conversations with EB's staff, it was understood that EB had the leading role; but at the end of the project they will act more as an advisor than a leader. It means that the ownership of the project will be transferred, together with the responsibilities to the quinoa association and the local government. EB is already transferring this ownership, comparing to the first project, EB's objectives focus in guiding and strengthening the strategic plans for the GMY or ensuring that local associations are conforming to the law.

The current strategy of use of awards bases of power could present a risk of supporting a paternalist relation; I can already observe that the farmers are receiving several incentives from different stakeholders and do not necessarily realise the economic and social value.

There is the question of responsibility of EB after the end of the project and continuity of their collaboration with the quinoa farmers. EB claims they will be happy to pursue the research if there are available funds and that will continue to support APROQUY<sup>74</sup>.

#### 4.5.2 The introduction of a new economic activity

As mentioned in the introduction, the region already has several economic activities and agriculture is one of the main ones. Compared to the other staples (like potato or fava bean), quinoa is a new culture, not part of the traditional diet and the main motivation is the high economic value.

##### 4.5.2.1 Yunchará's quinoa production and commercialization

The first three agricultural years served to identify the quinoa varieties<sup>75</sup> that adapted the best to Yunchará region. The EB team carried out a participatory research within the local producers, and concluded that the quinoa varieties that offered the best performance were: *Sajama*, *K'ellu* and *Pasancalla* (Martínez, De Souza, & Miranda, s. d., p. 10).

The three years study (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a, p. 30) reported that Yunchará's quinoa production increased from 155 kg/ha to 483.56 kg/ha in average. The production yield is not stable and last agriculture campaign was of 245 kg/ha. EB justifies the steady growth by the development and adaptation of production technology, the greater commitment of producers in the attention and care of their plots. EB argues that the average results are influenced by poor yields in plots that were neglected by their producers, showing high variability between plots, but also weather and pest factors<sup>76</sup>.

Esperanza Bolivia compared quinoa production to local commercialized staples: fava bean and potato. Quinoa has relatively low production costs, and even if the average yield is much lower (compared to potato and fava

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<sup>74</sup> I may infer that it is also if funds are available.

<sup>75</sup> Seven varieties of quinoa were tested: Blanca Real, Sajama, Pasancalla, K'ellu, Pantela, Waranga and Toledo.

<sup>76</sup> In the first stage are rodents or hares and when the plants are reaching the phenolic maturity (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a).

beans), the expected incomes and profits are the highest due to the high price in the market (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a, p. 32).

Today EB is present in all the production chain, from socialising the project, guiding new quinoa producers, training new farmers, distributing seeds<sup>77</sup>, technical assistance, supporting the harvest, lending the machinery to process quinoa, collect, control the quantities produced. LC's reports mention that the quinoa association is already taking some responsibilities. However, the strength of EB is to count with a truck and fuel that transport and group the harvest.

Based on the latest reports of LC (Louvain Coopération, 2015), during the last agriculture campaign (2013-2014), 30.71 ha were sown by 76 farmers in 16 communities. At the end of the agriculture campaign, 3.138 kg were harvested from 12.81 ha and 32 producers. The yield is 245 kg/ha, the number is lower than the average due to the plots that were abandoned or where only a few kilograms were harvested. Quinoa was commercialised by EB for the local breakfast and lunches programme, seeds for new season, research in San Lorenzo (out of Yunchará) and the nutritional workshops delivered by EB. The rest was commercialised directly by the farmers coming from Argentina.

#### 4.5.2.2 Challenges on the production

As an outsider, the first question will be why there is gap between the promised number of plots and the finally harvested ones? It could be said that it is influenced by environmental and human factors. Regarding the environmental challenges, the technical staff of EB and the farmers mentioned: the increasing climate change, (longer) drought periods, limited or non-existing watering systems<sup>78</sup>, frosting<sup>79</sup>, hailstorms, rodents and birds. These in a way influence part of the human factors: disappointment and/or abandon the quinoa plot. For example, it happens that after sowing, the birds come and eat the grains (EB advises to sow again) or if a frost occurred during one crucial moment, the culture is lost. However, in some of the cases, experimenting climate adversities reassures the producers about the quinoa. Quinoa is more resistant to drought, hailstorms and frost than other staples and in some cases not all the crop is lost when others are (e.g. potato or fava bean), which at least gives the impression to the farmer that "something can be rescued". Other reasons are the lack of care from producers to their plots, not following the advises and recommendations from the technical team, not enough time due to other activities like cattle, migration to other regions to work, limited the value of the quinoa due to the economic value and then to nutritional importance.

It could be interesting for a further study to analyse if the fact that quinoa is not part of the traditional diet and seen as a commercial staple, influence the decision by the farmers to produce it or how they take care of the sown plots, and if it increases the notion of the risk that it represents. If farmers are used to sell only a little surplus, investing too much time in their commercial activities may not be rewarding, because farmers may be used to first cover their basic needs (grow the food they eat). It is possible that some farmers started sowing after they saw the results of other farmers. Family agriculture (for family's own consumption) could be a good way to start, the advantage is that the "energy", time and resources invested are minor for the farmer. For example it could be done like two generation ago: one or two lines of quinoa among other staples<sup>80</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup> Based on the latest reports of LC, the endogenous quinoa variety that was tested during the internship of Benoit Tichoux is not part of the sown varieties. The government had expressed to me their concern to keep local varieties. The local government referred to the negative experience when a "fast grow" variety was introduced. Farmers preferred it against the endogenous version but early shows the negative side (i.e. not possible to store for long periods, pest problems).

<sup>78</sup> In 2007, only 15 of the plots benefited of a watering system (Böhrt, 2009, p. 24). The type of watering is a gravity irrigation system. There is no constant irrigation for the parcels, instead each producer knows when will be "their turn" every 15, 20 or 30 days. The water is carried out on the plots and then distributed without knowing the used quantity (Tichoux, 2013, p. 48).

<sup>79</sup> Yunchará has in average 107 frosting episodes during the year (Tichoux, 2013, p. 32).

<sup>80</sup> An alternative for a pilot programme is to choose two schools where they take care of the green house (i.e. Huayajara) and add one or two lines of quinoa; for Esperanza Bolivia it will take only a couple of minutes more of their time, and schools could be a multiplier as it is already for other vegetables in some cases.

#### 4.5.2.3 Quinoa commercialization

'Luckily for the *quinueros*, their production is not enough to cover the demand', says the GMY and EB. The NGO encourages the producers to first ensure their family's need on quinoa; second, to save seeds for the next production, and then the rest can be collected for commercialization. The current selling and commercialization channels are:

##### a) EB: intermediary between farmers and buyers

Until now, EB has contacted local and national buyers directly and sold the product based on the official national price. EB was also in charge to receive the payments and then directly pay the farmers, based on the quantity in the registers. EB has a complete and detailed control of the farmers payment and did not benefit from sales (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a, p. 22; Guerrero, 2014a; Louvain Coopération, 2015).

A majority of the quinoa is sold for the breakfast and lunch programmes of Yunchará and neighbour municipality. The rest is used for the nutritional workshops, seeds for next agriculture cycle and in a minor portion for research. (Esperanza Bolivia, 2013a, p. 22; Louvain Coopération, 2015).

##### b) Individual selling contacts

In some cases, farmers have sold their production to buyers that come directly and pay them in cash. The advantage for them is that they do not need to wait several months before being paid, the buyer comes directly to their house. This scenario happened in Cienegas Fronteras, where the larger production takes place. Buyers came from Argentina (two hours from there). This type of selling goes against the "solidarity" and "joint efforts" of the quinoa association.

##### c) Exchange markets

In the past it was customary that the people from the different ecological areas met once or twice a year to exchange food and products; for example the valley will offer fruits or goat's products, the highland can exchange potatoes or llama meat. Today it is not common, but the government tries to re-ignite the exchange market and organise once a year an exchange day in the municipality. The last one was in 2015, my contact in Tarija told me that the Tojo's school exchanged quinoa cookies that they learn to make in the last nutritional workshop given by EB. It is very positive, because they are not quinoa producers, but persons who participated in the EB workshops.

#### 4.5.2.4 Impact on the environment

During 2013, Benoit Tichoux (Tichoux, 2013, p. 60), Belgian student of a master in Science and environment management, made an assessment of the environmental impact of quinoa cultivation in the Tarijeño's highland as part of his internship with the NGO EB. He stated that the project norms and action were "friendly to the environment", which does not mean that the quinoa culture did not have an impact on the environment. In addition, in his opinion, organic quinoa should be produced under the frame of a sustainable development.

*Crop rotation:* NGO EB suggests to the farmers to integrate the quinoa cultivation in a cycle of crop rotation: potato > quinoa > oat and/or barley > fava beans and peas. The reasons behind this: taking best advantages of the soil nutrients, avoiding soil degradation and loss of fertility, advantage of the nutrients left by the previous crop, helping prevention of pest and plant diseases. During the on-field observations, for the farmers visited, they seem to comply with the crop rotation, because where they sowed quinoa last year, now they were sowing something else.

*Fallow period:* The limited personal observation let me infer that farmers do not always practice fallow periods in their plots, but it is not possible to establish a percentage. Tichoux, (2013, p. 53) says "that EB encourage the fallow period to the producers that have enough plots, but EB does not advise on the duration or frequency".

Based in the Yunchara's Development Plan (2007, p. 19), 61% of the families own land surface of less than one hectare. If a family has to grow divers staples, adding fallow period becomes harder as it reduces the effective cultivated surface. Also those families will not necessarily feel encouraged to use all or a majority of their surface to grow a relatively new staple that is not even part of their diet.

The introduction of this economic activity supports government's policies and development strategies. The National Quinoa Policy<sup>81</sup> (NQP) has the objective to promote and implement a sustainable, productive industrialisation and commercial system for the domestic and international market. The NQP has been applied to Yunchará by two main axes: first, strengthening private productive organisations<sup>82</sup>, and second, increase the consumption through school breakfast and lunch programmes. As Gladys Alarcón, Yunchará mayor says, "Even before the announcement of the NQP and the International Year of the Quinoa, the Municipality of Yunchará, together with Esperanza Bolivia, worked to support the nutritional policies" (« Interview with Gladys Alarcon - Government of Yunchará », 2014)

#### 4.5.3 Influence in the beneficiaries lifestyle and personal development

##### 4.5.3.1 Quinoa consumption in Yunchará

Through interviews with local inhabitants, it was found that quinoa was sown two generations ago, as part of the rotation staples (potato, barley and fava bean) and part of their diet. In the past, it was consumed one to four times a month in soups and sometimes in stews. Inhabitants and NGOs staff working in the region believe that the different factors that reduced the consumption and stop the production of quinoa are: a) economic migration to closest cities and to Argentina (a couple of hours away); b) the influence of immigrants coming back and bringing new food and dietary habits; c) that *Tarijeños* feeling to be more connected to Argentina than Bolivia due to geographic characteristics; d) USA aid policies where wheat and sub products were donated in rural zones, PL480.

Today, the quinoa consumption in Yunchará is being encouraged and is increasing little by little. Thanks to the work of local and international NGO's and aid programmes such as WFP<sup>83</sup>. In addition and based on the national policy, the GMY is an active promoter of quinoa production and consumption. For example, locally produced quinoa is bought by the local government for the school's breakfast and lunch programmes. There are also new multipliers among the inhabitants that are convinced of the benefits of quinoa consumption, notably some local teachers eager to pass the knowledge and motivation to include quinoa and vegetables in their (and children's) diet.

In Yunchará quinoa is consumed basically in three ways: bought it at the city of Tarija or Villazón (already *beneficiada*), personal farmer's production<sup>84</sup>, and during school breakfasts and lunches.

##### 4.5.3.2 Personality and lifestyle

In the study done by Böhrst during 2007-2008 (2009, p. 61), it is argued that one of the principal impacts of the projects done by NGOs is the influence in the beneficiaries' use of their time and the labour diversification. During the interview with Yunchará mayor, (« Interview with Gladys Alarcon - Government of Yunchará », 2014), she said "the government would like that the producers have a productive vocation, we do not want that

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<sup>81</sup> In 2009, the Ministry of Rural Development and Lands and the National Council of Quinoa Producers and Sellers elaborated a complete policy proposition. (Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras & Consejo Nacional de Comercializadores y Productores de Quinoa, 2009). But it was until 2011 that the law 98 was declared and established as national priority the production, industrialisation and commercialisation of the quinoa (Ministerio de Comunicación, 2013).

<sup>82</sup> Farmers' associations most of the time do not have any institutional frame and this do not allow them to improve their interaction and communication with the state.

<sup>83</sup> Quinoa was donated years ago to local schools by the UN world food programme

<sup>84</sup> Esperanza Bolivia conducted two surveys about eating quinoa during the project identified that over 80% of respondents consume quinoa at least once a month.

they just try a bit of all [associations]. That is a charge in time and energy and if he doesn't see results, he will be frustrated". The mayor believes that if the producers only focus in one thing (for an economic activity) then maybe they will be more motivated to dare new things. During farmers' interviews, there were several cases: some farmers that have a large carrier in several associations and belongs to several ones, and others who only had join one or two maximum.

Adding the duties of representing and association or a business unit will already impact to the charged farmer's lifestyle. It was identified that some APROQUY's board members and leaders are or were active in other local associations (producers or peasants organisations). In some cases, the youth is following the steps of their fathers, which is the case of the APROQUY young secretary.

A point that value a deeper study is the role of the association and producers meetings creating and developing a social network and social bonding<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> It was observed that there are limited social and leisure activities between communities. It is understandable due to the geographic dispersion and overcharged daily-life. A government representative mentioned that the government looks to increase the interaction organising some sportive marches or fairs.

## 5 Conclusions

Without any doubt NGO Esperanza Bolivia's staff is working hard and giving a big amount of their energy and efforts in order to accomplish the projects objectives and support the quinoa producers and their association. The result of their work can be tangibly seen through the direct effect of their daily activities (i.e. nutritional workshop, technical visits or training new farmers), but also through longer-term influences like developing a new economic activity, the introduction of quinoa in the family diet at Yunchará or the influence on the strategic plans of the local government. The NGO has valuable strengths: structured vision, generation of high valuable scientific knowledge, technical know-how and legitimacy toward the funders, partners, government and farmers. These characteristics have facilitated the relations with their main stakeholders and guaranteed the NGO its subsistence.

Esperanza Bolivia's relationships with the partners are based on long-term trust and legitimacy. These institutions have a common belief (i.e. economic development through quinoa) and they complement each other with their different strengths (i.e. expertise, legitimacy or informational). The fact that those relations are tainted by the "donor-recipient" structure, EB has to fulfil the demands of LC<sup>86</sup> in terms of results, reporting and project management. I observed that there is a constant need and effort to remain legitimate, which is delimited and given by the stronger parties believes. Another aftereffect is that EB faces different dilemmas mentioned in the literature: economic dependency on donors, working in a top-down design within a project delivery base. It has been showcased how the need for legitimacy can highly influence the project action lines and the daily life of the on-field team (i.e. dilemmas during technology transfer or multiple use of award power that could support the paternalism culture). In a conscious or unconscious way, the on-line fieldworkers and EB staff respond to these dilemmas (i.e. satisfying the report structure or supporting farmers not members of the association).

These conclusions are two-fold. First, the impact of the different bases of power in the daily life and a long-term influence on the quinoa farmers. Second, the commonalities and potential risks for the Yunchará's farmers that appear from the comparison of the realities of quinoa farmers of the associations that supply the international market.

### Impact of the different bases of power in the daily life and a long-term influence for the quinoa farmers

The award, expertise and legitimacy bases of power influence the everyday life and the way to achieve the measurable and short-term objectives. For example, it affects the number of farmers, the surfaces sowed or the way to on-site training is given the farmers.

It has been mentioned how farmers sometimes perceive EB, GMY and PROMETA as a single "group". The reason for this is that farmers see legitimacy, expertise and a source of awards in all three institutions. Such awards are delivered in a constant way, uncoordinated and they are not always valued by the receiver. It can create some discomfort among EB's staff; however, they continue offering them.

It is worth reflecting upon is the mid and long-term consequences of the project and actions of EB<sup>87</sup>. The most evident ones are the effect on quinoa production, the official recognition of the association, and the food security and agriculture strategy of the GYM that EB supports. Within the framework of the project EB also plans several trainings for good manufacture techniques, commercialisation and logistic. That implies the development of skills and knowledge among the farmers and their associations. Evidently, it will take also some time for people to embrace that new activity<sup>88</sup>, develop and consolidate those skills and gained information. Will the project of EB still run when it happens? Will that responsibility be part of the GMY?

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<sup>86</sup> Who certainly complies with the demands of DGD.

<sup>87</sup> Independently of the national policies that may continue or not supporting the quinoa distribution in schools lunch programmes or for the elders.

<sup>88</sup> There is already an acknowledge that the farmers have a very diverse working activities and that this may avoid focusing in one economic activity.

### Potential risks for quinoa farmers resulting from comparison with the international market.

In the introduction of this thesis, I pointed out how NGOs and cooperation agencies have coached, endorsed and influenced the Bolivian farmers to commercialize their quinoa through associative channels. Some authors have blamed NGOs for looking to supply the northern countries. In addition, the NGOs have delimited the legitimacy of the association based upon their constant and controlled production<sup>89</sup> and ended the commercial agreements when the association does not comply. Last but not least, a consequence of the increasing exporting activities is the rise of domestic prices and decrease of the local consumption<sup>90</sup>.

In the case of Yunchará, quinoa was re-introduced as food security solution and economic crop. Farmers' main reason to cultivate it is the high selling value. Of course quinoa starts to become part of the diet of the producer's family and consumed in the lunch at the schools; but it remains positioned as a commodity and niche food, due to its high selling price and limited availability to buy locally produced quinoa. There are no selling points in the municipality and the consumption is mostly limited to vulnerable population (children) under a subsidy (i.e. schools who receive quinoa from the GMY). In addition, the municipality is producing quinoa that is mostly consumed by another municipality (Yacuiba<sup>91</sup>), like Bolivia is exporting the majority of quinoa production.

Last but not least, the NGO EB has influenced and endorsed the creation of the quinoa association. Until today it supports it (indirectly) economically and morally. EB and its partners have already defined what will let the association being legitimate: increasing and steady production. The NGO also lead the distribution and commercialisation (creation of the business unit). If the business unit continues the commercialising strategy, it means that the sales to major distributors will be privileged over the local distribution or alternative economies of exchange.

I conclude with a personal reflection, based on my experience accompanying Esperanza Bolivia for two months. The role and degree of influence of Esperanza Bolivia is much bigger than I considered in the beginning, especially in the long-term and farmers' lifestyle (i.e. another economic activity and skills development). I am aware of the complex role that EB plays being a broker and translator between northern partners, local partners or the farmers. The EB team adapts subtly to each institution and finds common grounds (despite different agendas) in order to achieve something and run the project. I realise that while being there and working every as part of the team I absolutely believed that I was doing a "good action". It took me a couple of months to detach and being able analyse in the most neutral way possible. Fowler (2005), said "It is increasingly difficult, if not misleading, to see NGDOs as voluntary organisations guided by an altruistic ethos [...] It is probably more honest and appropriate to consider today's NGDO-ism as forms of social entrepreneurship'. Indeed, I do agree.

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<sup>89</sup> Certifications, constant volume and quality.

<sup>90</sup> There are other factors like the international aid programmes introducing wheat, economic migration, national wheat subsidy.

<sup>91</sup> Agricultural campaign 2012-2013

## 6 Annex

### List of interviews

<b>Name</b>	<b>Function/organisation</b>	<b>Date of interview</b>
Mabel Bejarano	Former nutritionist at Esperanza Bolivia (currently working for GMY)	From 1/09 to 7/11 2014 - 17/01/2015 - 2/2/2015 - 7/3/2015
Gladys Alarcon, mayor	Alcaldia Yunchara	20/10/2014
Guillermo/turism/history	Alcaldia Yunchara	Several encounters from 1/09 to 7/11 2014
Ing. Olver/food security	Alcaldia Yunchara	Several encounters from 1/09 to 7/11 2014
Person requested anonymity	PROSOL	23/10/2014
Angel	Driver/Esperanza Bolivia	From 1/09 to 7/11 2014
Josue	Quinoa on site expert/Esperanza Bolivia	From 1/09 to 7/11 2014
Oswaldo	Quinoa on site expert/Esperanza Bolivia	From 1/09 to 7/11 2014
Vicent	Project coordination/Esperanza Bolivia	From 1/09 to 7/11 2014
Sergio Martinez	General Manager/Esperanza Bolivia	From 1/09 to 7/11 2014 - 1/04/2015
Sebastian Colque	Representative at Federación Campesinos	8/10/2014
Vincent Henin	Belgian headquarter food security expert/Louvain Coopération	25/03/2015
Carlos Jalil	Program manager/Plan Internacional	17/11/2014
Sra Tejerina	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	25/09/2014
Alejandro	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	07 and 14/10/2014
Farmer from Buenavista	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	4/11/2014
Don Galeano	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Eudolio	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Ignacio	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	14/10/2014

Don Isidro	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Juan	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	14/10/2014
Don Orlando	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	14/10/2014
Doña Marta	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	2/10/2014
Don Miguel Colque	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	September 2014
Don Mario Garnica	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	September 2014
Don Mateo Tapia	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	September 2014
Don Edmundo	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Eleodoro Marquez	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	29/09/2014
Sr Eulalia and husband	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	2/10/2014
Don Grover Saldana	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	14/10/2014
Din Ignacio Tintilai	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	14/10/2014
Don Iman	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Jose Luis Tapia	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Valentin Gregorio	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	7/10/2014
Dona Segundina	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	2/10/2014
Don Rene	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/10/2014
Don Pascual Condori	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	8/01/1900
Don Raul	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	25/09/2014 and 02/10/2014
Don Pedro Colque	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	2/10/2014
Don Orlando Gregorio	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	7/10/2014

Don Luis Jose	Local quinoa farmer or potential farmer	14/10/2014
Maruska Barrios	PROMETA	29/09/2014
Stand worker	SENAGAG	27/09/2014
Ruth	Esperanza Bolivia head of health programmes	2/10/2014
Daniel Perez Cueto	Louvain Coopétation Bolivia, project manager, food security expert	18/12/2014
Wilfredo Rojas	PROINPA	26/09/2014

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